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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
TARA A. ROGERS, : Case No. 20000812-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (1996). The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah sentenced Defendant/Appellant Tara A. Rogers ("Appellant" 
or "Rogers") and entered judgment of conviction for attempted possession of a controlled 
substance, a class A misdemeanor (R. 42). A copy of the Judgment is in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW. PRESERVATION 
Issue. Whether the trial judge violated due process, Appellant's right to appear 
and defend, and Utah R. Crim. P. 22 when he sentenced Appellant in absentia to the 
maximum sentence without affording defense counsel or the state an opportunity to speak 
at sentencing. 
Standard of Review. This issue involves a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996) (issue of whether 
defendant was properly sentenced in absentia involves a question of law). In addition, the 
ultimate issue as to whether Appellant voluntarily absented herself from sentencing is 
reviewed for correctness. See generally State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah App. 
1996) (reviewing ultimate issue of whether consent to search was voluntary for 
correctness). While a trial judge ordinarily has discretion in sentencing, such discretion is 
not unlimited. See State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993) ( recognizing trial 
court exceeds its discretion when it fails to sentence based on reliable and relevant 
information, and reviewing question of whether trial judge sentenced defendant based on 
reliable and relevant information as a question of law). Any underlying factual findings 
are reviewed for clear error. See generally State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) 
(factual findings are reviewed for clear error). 
Preservation. Neither defense counsel nor the prosecutor was afforded the 
opportunity to present information relevant to the sentence or to address the issue of 
whether sentencing in absentia was appropriate (R. 80:1-2); see Addendum B containing 
transcript of sentencing hearing. After Judge Frederick concluded that Rogers had 
waived her right to presence at sentencing, defense counsel attempted to make a record 
but was interrupted by the judge (R. 80:2). Defense counsel did manage to note her 
objection to sentencing in absentia before the trial judge dismissed her (R. 80:2). Within 
ten days of sentencing, defense counsel filed a "Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence" 
preserving the issues raised in this appeal (R. 46). A copy of that motion is in 
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Addendum C. The trial judge denied that motion (R. 51). In addition, the trial judge 
entered findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the propriety of sentencing 
Rogers in absentia (R. 43-44); see Addendum D. Hence, the issues raised herein are 
preserved for appellate review.1 
In addition, the trial judge considered the identical issue in the case immediately 
prior to this case (compare R. 41 in this case, indicating that sentencing occurred on 
August 4, 2000 before Judge Frederick and was recorded on tape number 1 at 9:47-9:48, 
with R. 33 in State v. Hamling, Case No. 20000813-CA, currently pending before this 
Court, indicating that sentencing in absentia in Hamling was held before Judge Frederick 
on August 4, 2000 and was recorded on tape number 1 at 9:43-9:47). At the Hamling 
sentencing, Judge Frederick noted defense counsel's objection to proceeding with 
sentencing in absentia (R. 64:2 in State v. Hamling, Case No. 2000813-CA). This 
previous hearing coupled with the judge's ruling, the entry of findings and conclusions, 
1
 The purposes of the preservation rules are to: (1) allow the trial court the 
opportunity to review and correct any errors, and (2) preclude defense counsel from 
foregoing objections as a matter of strategy and when the strategy does not work and 
defendant is convicted, claiming error. State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 36 Utah 1989); 
State v. Labrum. 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996); State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 159 
(Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990). In this case where the trial judge 
reviewed the issue of whether to proceed in absentia at sentencing and entered findings 
and conclusions on that issue, both of those purposes were met. The trial court had the 
opportunity to review the issue and correct the error, and no possible trial strategy existed 
for foregoing the objection. Moreover, the trial court had the opportunity to correct the 
error in proceeding in absentia as well as the error in failing to afford counsel the 
opportunity to present pertinent information, when defense counsel filed a timely post-
judgment motion. Accordingly, the issue was properly preserved for appeal. 
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and defendant's post-trial motion establish that the judge fully considered the issue and 
the issue was preserved for review. 
Alternatively, even if the issue had not been preserved, the trial judge committed 
plain error in proceeding in absentia and in failing to base the sentencing decision on 
relevant and reliable information without affording defense counsel the opportunity to 
speak. See Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071; Utah R. Crim. P. 22; State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 
1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993) (plain error occurs when an error is obvious and prejudices 
the defendant). Under Johnson and Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a), the error in failing to conduct 
a full sentencing hearing was obvious as was the denial of Rogers' right to presence at 
sentencing under Article I, section 12, Utah Constitution. The obvious error prejudiced 
Rogers since she received the maximum sentence when she otherwise was a candidate for 
probation; see discussion infra at 11-12. 
Additionally, exceptional circumstances require review of this issue. See State v. 
Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah App. 1996). Utah R. Evid. 22(a) mandates that a trial judge 
afford defendant the opportunity to provide relevant information at sentencing; due 
process requires the judge to conduct a full and fair sentencing hearing. Where the judge 
does not afford counsel the opportunity to speak and does not conduct a full and fair 
sentencing hearing, a procedural anomaly requiring review exists. See id. (exceptional 
circumstances doctrine generally applies to rare procedural anomalies). The question of 
whether the trial judge imposed a legal sentence is of extraordinary importance and 
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widespread interest as evidenced by the number of cases before this Court raising a 
similar issue. Id. (doctrine of exceptional circumstances may be applied where "matters 
of extraordinary importance or widespread interest" exist).2 Without appellate review, the 
egregious violation of due process, Rule 22 and the right to presence which occurred in 
this case would go unchecked. In this case where the trial judge had the obligation to 
conduct a full and fair sentencing hearing and failed to do so, exceptional circumstances 
require that this Court review the issue on appeal. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following rules and constitutional provision is in Addendum E: 
UtahR.Crim. 17(a)(2); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22; 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7; 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12; 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 19 , 2000, the state charged Rogers with unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance, to-wit: cocaine, a third degree felony ( R. 05-06). On June 20, 
2000, Rogers pled guilty to attempted unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a 
2
 Some of the cases before this Court in which the trial judge in this case 
sentenced the defendant in absentia to the maximum sentence without affording counsel 
an opportunity to present relevant information include: State v. Payne, Case No. 
20000497-CA (oral argument scheduled for February 23, 2000); State v. WanosiL 
Case No. 20000541-CA (oral argument scheduled for February 23, 2000); State v. 
Samora, Case No. 20000884-CA (opening brief filed); and State v. Vicente, Case No. 
20000955-CA. 
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class A misdemeanor, before the Honorable William W. Barrett (R. 79). A copy of the 
transcript of the plea hearing is in Addendum F. Judge Barrett scheduled sentencing for 
August 4, 2000 before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick and referred Rogers for a 
presentence report (R. 79:5-6). When Rogers failed to appear at sentencing on August 4, 
2000, Judge Frederick sentenced her to the maximum one year sentence (R. 80). 
On August 9, 2000, the trial judge signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
(R. 43). See Addendum D. On August 10, 2000, defense counsel filed a motion to 
correct the sentence (R. 46-47); see Addendum C. On August 30, 2000, the trial judge 
denied the motion to correct the sentence by signed minute entry (R. 51). In addition, 
Rogers was booked into jail on August 30, 2000. Appellant filed a timely notice of 
appeal on August 31, 2000 (R. 62). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
According to the probable cause statement in the Information, a West Valley 
police officer stopped a vehicle for broken taillights (R. 08). Rogers was a passenger in 
that vehicle (R. 08). Rogers "was looking for the license plate in the trunk of her vehicle, 
and at the same time, she began placing her hands inside the pockets of her pants and 
jacket. Officer Crandall observed a white plastic object on the ground at the defendant's 
feet. It was a baggie of white powdery substance, later field-tested positive for cocaine" 
(R. 08). 
Rogers had lived at the same address in Taylorsville, Utah for eighteen years 
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(R. 12). She lived at that address with her mother and father (R. 12). She had lived in the 
area her entire life, and, as a personal reference, she listed a neighbor whom she had 
known for twenty-two years (R. 12). 
After Rogers pled guilty, Judge Barrett ordered that a presentence report be 
prepared and scheduled sentencing before Judge Frederick (R. 79:5-6). On July 21, 2000, 
Judge Frederick revoked Rogers' release and issued an arrest warrant because Rogers had 
not appeared for preparation of a presentence report (R. 38-39). The arrest warrant listed 
the address in Taylorsville where Rogers had lived for eighteen years (R. 39). 
On August 4, 2000, Rogers did not appear at sentencing (R. 80:2). Without 
affording either party the opportunity to address the propriety of sentencing Rogers in 
absentia or present information relevant to the appropriate sentence, Judge Frederick 
summarily concluded that Rogers had voluntarily absented herself and sentenced Rogers 
to the maximum one year sentence (R. 80:2-3); see Addendum B. 
Rogers was arrested on August 29, 2000 and booked into the Salt Lake County Jail 
on August 30, 2000 (R. 54). On September 7, 2000, the court filed a letter from Rogers 
in which she apologized for not appearing at sentencing, and asked the trial court to 
review her sentence (R. 71). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial judge violated Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) and due process by failing to afford 
the parties an opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing and by otherwise 
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failing to base the sentence on relevant information or to conduct a full and fair 
sentencing hearing. Imposing a maximum sentence based solely on the failure to appear 
without considering the nature and circumstances of the crime, defendant's background or 
society's interests and without affording the parties the opportunity to present information 
relevant to sentencing violates the rule and due process and requires a new sentencing 
hearing. 
The trial judge further violated due process, the right to presence, and the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure by sentencing Appellant in absentia. Appellant did not knowingly 
waive her right to presence at sentencing in this case where she was not informed that she 
would be sentenced even if she were not present. The critical role of presence at 
sentencing requires that the right to presence not be lightly forfeited. In this case where 
Appellant did not waive her right to be present at sentencing, the trial court erred in 
sentencing her in absentia and the sentence must be vacated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT SENTENCED APPELLANT IN ABSENTIA TO THE 
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE SENTENCE WITHOUT ANY INPUT 
FROM EITHER PARTY. 
Judge Frederick began the sentencing proceeding by pointing out, "this is 
apparently another one of these absentia cases, right?" (R. 80:2). Without affording either 
party an opportunity to speak regarding the propriety of sentencing Rogers in absentia, 
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give a legal reason for not proceeding with sentencing or present information relevant to 
sentencing, Judge Frederick then stated: 
The - - this Court will determine that she has likewise voluntarily absented 
herself from these proceedings. She was advised both orally and in writing 
to appear before this Court, as - - on today's date, as well as appear at 
A.C.E.C, for reasons not known to whatever - whoever the clerk was who 
referred her. She did not appear there, a warrant was previously issued for 
her arrest. No further contact has been made with her, therefore I will 
determine that she's voluntarily absented herself from these proceedings. 
And I will order, based upon her failure to comply with the terms and 
conditions of this Court's previous order, that she be committed to the Salt 
Lake County Detention Center forthwith for the period of one year . . . . 
(R. 80:2-3). The prosecutor thereafter prepared findings of fact and conclusions of law, a 
copy of which is in Addendum D, which focused solely on the voluntariness of Rogers' 
failure to appear and did not address whether she knowingly waived her right to presence 
(R. 43-44). 
A. THE TRIAL JUDGE VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND UTAH R. 
CRIM. P. 22 WHEN HE SENTENCED ROGERS TO THE MAXIMUM 
SENTENCE WITHOUT CONSIDERING RELEVANT AND RELIABLE 
INFORMATION AND WITHOUT AFFORDING THE PARTIES THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK AT SENTENCING. 
The state and federal due process clauses "require[] that a sentencing judge act on 
reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing sentence." 
State v. Howell 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985): see also Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071 (state 
and federal due process protections applicable to sentencing require that judge make 
sentencing decision based on reliable and relevant information). A sentence which is not 
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based on reliable and relevant information violates due process and must be vacated. See 
id. at 1071-75 (vacating sentence based on unreliable hearsay report). 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) further attempts to effectuate the due process requirement 
of a full and fair sentencing hearing based on relevant and reliable information by 
requiring sentencing judges to give both the defendant and the prosecutor an opportunity 
to present any information which might be material to the sentence. Utah R. Crim. P. 
22(a) states in part: 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an 
opportunity to make a statement and to present information in mitigation of 
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be 
imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to 
present any information material to the imposition of sentence. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) (emphasis added); see Howelh 707 P.2d at 118 (n[t]o ensure 
fairness in the sentencing procedure, [Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a)] directs trial courts to hear 
evidence from both the defendant and the prosecution that is relevant to the sentence to be 
imposed"). 
The plain language of Rule 22(a) places on the trial court the responsibility to 
afford defense counsel the opportunity to speak at sentencing and to present information 
relevant to sentencing.3 While Rule 22(a) mandates that the trial court give the parties the 
opportunity to speak at sentencing, due process as outlined in Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071, 
3
 Where a defendant is represented by counsel, defendant presents information 
through defense counsel. 
10 
requires that any sentence imposed by a trial judge be based on reliable and relevant 
information. Working together, Rule 22(a) and due process require a trial judge to make 
sure that a fair and full sentencing hearing which meets due process requirements occurs. 
In this case, the trial court did not afford defense counsel or the prosecutor the 
opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing. Failure to hold a full 
sentencing hearing and the concomitant failure to base the sentencing decision on 
complete and accurate information requires a new sentencing hearing pursuant to 
Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071-75. In a case such as the present one where the trial judge did 
not afford defense counsel or the prosecutor the opportunity to present information 
pertinent to the sentencing decision, conducting a harmless error review would undermine 
the due process requirement of a full and fair sentencing hearing. Since defense counsel 
was not given the opportunity to present relevant information, complete information 
favorable to the defendant is not in the record. Moreover, the prosecutor may have been 
aware of mitigating circumstances and requested a less severe sentence; that information 
would likewise not be in the record since the prosecutor was not afforded the opportunity 
to speak. Reviewing the record under these circumstances to determine whether the 
missing information would have impacted on the sentence would be ludicrous where the 
parties were not afforded the opportunity to include that information in the record. 
Even if this Court were to attempt a review for prejudice, however, the record in 
this case demonstrates harm caused by the court's failure to afford counsel the 
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opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing. The record demonstrates that 
the crime was a relatively minor possession of a controlled substance charge. No 
violence was involved and nothing in the record indicates that Rogers has a history of 
violence. The record suggests that drug treatment and probation rather than incarceration 
for the maximum period would be the appropriate sentence and best serve society's 
interests. In fact, while the record does not contain any indication of criminal charges 
against Rogers prior to the incident in this case, it suggests that her life had taken a turn 
after the charges in this case were filed, and that treatment and the intervention caused by 
probation might reverse that downward turn (compare R. 12 on March 13, 2000 with 
R. 16 on June 8, 2000). Additionally, Rogers lived with her parents, had been employed 
and appears from the record to be precisely the type of person judges place on probation. 
Had the judge been fully aware of the circumstances, probation, not the maximum 
sentence, would have been likely in this case. 
Rogers' nonappearance at sentencing does not alter the likelihood that she would 
not have received the maximum sentence. First, failing to appear at sentencing is 
punishable by other means and should not enter into the sentencing decision. For 
example, a defendant who fails to appear at sentencing can be charged with a separate 
crime or held on a bench warrant after not appearing. In addition, if the judge sentences a 
defendant in absentia, the defendant loses the right to allocution which can play an 
important role in mitigating sentence; see discussion infra at 15-27 regarding impropriety 
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absentia. In this case, Judge Frederick clearly indicated that he based his decision to 
impose the maximum sentence on Rogers' failure to appear at sentencing (R. 80:2-3). In 
so doing, he failed to consider the nature and circumstances of the crime, Rogers' 
background and society's interests. See State v. McClendon. 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 
1980) (sentence must be based on nature of crime, defendant's background and interests 
of society). 
Common sense dictates that imposing a maximum sentence based solely on a 
failure to appear at sentencing can result in sentences which are not appropriate in light of 
society's interests, the nature of the crime or the defendant's background, and which 
impact profoundly on criminal justice resources. Filling the jail with misdemeanants 
serving maximum sentences who are irresponsible regarding their court dates but who 
otherwise do not present a threat to society nor deserve severe punishment makes little 
sense. Instead, the sentencing decision is more appropriately based on a complete review 
of the nature of the crime and the background of the defendant. 
Additionally, even if nonappearance at sentencing were considered in determining 
the appropriate sentence, it would be only one of several factors to be considered. 
MA sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant in light of his 
background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of society which 
underlie the criminal justice system." McClendon, 611 P.2d at 729. In other words, 
pursuant to McClendon, Johnson and due process, a sentence must be based not only on 
13 
the circumstances of the crime, but also on other factors such as the defendant's 
background and the interests of society. The crime in this case where Rogers possessed 
cocaine for personal use was relatively minor. Nothing suggests that Rogers has an 
extensive criminal background. Even if society had a minimal interest in punishing 
people who fail to appear at sentencing through harsher sentences4, society's greater 
interest in this case is to attempt to change the behavior through treatment and probation. 
In this case where the nature and circumstances of the crime, Rogers' background and 
society's interests all weigh in favor of probation, Rogers was prejudiced by the trial 
court's failure to conduct a full and fair sentencing hearing. 
As a final matter, while the issue was preserved based on the trial judge's ruling at 
sentencing and Rogers' post-trial motion on which the trial judge also ruled, even if this 
issue had not been preserved for appellate review, it nevertheless was plain error 
requiring that the sentence be vacated. The error in failing to afford defense counsel the 
opportunity to speak on behalf of her client and in otherwise failing to base the sentencing 
decision on reliable and relevant information was obvious in light of Rule 22(a) and 
Johnson. See generally Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09 (plain error occurs where error is 
4
 Appellant maintains that a defendant's failure to appear should not be part of the 
sentencing consideration, and is better addressed through measures other than increasing 
the sentence. Because the judge can issue a bench warrant and hold a person for several 
days who was otherwise free on release, failures to appear are adequately addressed 
through the issuance of a bench warrant. Moreover, in extreme cases, the state can file 
charges when a defendant fails to appear. 
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obvious and prejudices defendant). The obviousness of the error in failing to afford 
counsel the opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing is bolstered by Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7) (1999) which mandates that the trial judge receive any 
information regarding the appropriate sentence which the parties desire to present, and 
that such information "be presented in open court on the record and in the presence of the 
defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7). 
While this due process error requires vacation of the sentence regardless of 
whether prejudice is apparent in the record (see discussion supra at 10-11), even if 
prejudice were required, the record demonstrates that Rogers was harmed by the judge's 
failure to conduct a full and fair sentencing hearing. As outlined supra at 11-12, the error 
in failing to afford defense counsel the opportunity to present information relevant to 
sentencing prejudiced Rogers since the trial judge was not fully informed of the nature 
and circumstances of the crime or Rogers' background. Had the trial judge been fully 
informed and considered all relevant and reliable information, probation would have been 
the appropriate sentence. 
Exceptional circumstances also require review of this issue. See Irwin. 924 P.2d 
at 11. The irregular procedure which occurred in this case whereby the judge sentenced 
Rogers in absentia without affording either party the opportunity to speak is an 
exceptional circumstance which requires review; see discussion supra at 4-5. Without 
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review, the flagrant violation of Rogers' right to due process which occurred in this case 
would not be scrutinized nor corrected. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND UTAH R. 
CRIM. P. 22 BY SENTENCING ROGERS IN ABSENTIA. 
In addition to failing to comply with Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) and due process in 
conducting the sentencing hearing without affording counsel the opportunity to present 
relevant information, Judge Frederick violated Rule 22, due process and Article I, 
section 12, Utah Constitution by sentencing Rogers in absentia. Article I, section 12, 
Utah Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee 
the right to be present at sentencing. See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109-10; United States v. 
McPherson, 421 F.2d 1127, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Because the right to presence at 
sentencing is constitutionally guaranteed, the trial judge may not proceed in absentia 
unless the defendant waives the right to presence. 
1. The Record Does Not Demonstrate a Knowing Waiver of the Right to 
Presence at Sentencing; Rogers Was Not Informed That the Sentencing 
Would Occur If She Was Not Present and It Cannot Be Assumed That 
Rogers Would Have Known That She Would Be Sentenced in Absentia If 
She Did Not Appear. 
Any waiver of the right to be present at sentencing "must be voluntary and involve 
an intentional relinquishment of a known right." Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110 (further 
citation omitted). The burden is on the state to establish waiver, and a knowing and 
voluntary waiver may not be presumed by the trial court. State v. Houtz. 714 P.2d 677, 
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678-79 (Utah 1986). 
In order to knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to presence at sentencing, the 
defendant must, at the very least, be given notice of the proceedings. Anderson. 929 P.2d 
at 1110. In addition, the directive given the defendant must provide sufficient warning 
that the hearing will proceed even if the defendant is not present for a knowing waiver of 
the right to presence to occur. McPherson, 421 F.2d at 1129-30. 
In Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111, the Supreme Court held that sentencing the 
defendant in absentia did not violate the defendant's right to allocution where the 
defendant was informed of the trial date and signed a written waiver of his right to be 
present. Id. at 1110-11. The Court recognized that the right to allocution at sentencing 
"is an inseparable part of the right to be present" found in Article I, section 12, Utah 
Constitution. Id. at 1111. Anderson waived his right to allocution by his voluntary 
absence after being informed of the trial date, his execution of a written waiver of his 
right to be present, his failure to appear at trial, and his failure to keep in touch with 
counsel or appear at sentencing. Id. at 1110-11. 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Anderson is consistent with the McPherson 
approach of requiring that the defendant be informed that the proceeding will be held 
without him in order to have a knowing waiver5, and must be read in light of the facts and 
5
 McPherson focused on the nature of the communication with the defendant, i.e. 
on whether the defendant was informed the hearing would proceed in his absence, in 
determining whether the defendant knowingly waived his right to presence. McPherson. 
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policy considerations relevant to the circumstances under which Anderson failed to 
appear. Because Anderson was warned of the consequences of failing to appear and had 
signed a written waiver of his right to presence in which he agreed to be tried in absentia, 
requiring that the defendant be warned of the consequences of nonappearance in order to 
find a knowing waiver of the right to presence fits squarely within the Anderson holding. 
See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. Relying on McPherson, the Anderson court stated, "[t]o 
intentionally relinquish the right to be present, the defendant must have notice of the 
proceedings.n L± (citing McPherson, 421 F.2d at 1130). Since the notice required in 
McPherson was that sentencing would proceed without the defendant if he did not appear, 
this reliance on McPherson in Anderson requires that the defendant be given notice that 
the sentencing will occur even if he does not appear in order to sentence in absentia. 
Requiring that a defendant be informed that sentencing will proceed without him 
for there to be a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to presence is also consistent 
with United States Supreme Court case law regarding trials in absentia pursuant to Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 43. See Crosby v. United States. 506 U.S. 255, 256, 113 S.Ct. 748, 749, 122 
L.Ed.2d 25 (1993). In Crosby, the Court recognized that it cannot be assumed that a 
defendant who fails to appear knows that a trial will go on without him. In fact, ,K[s]ince 
421 F.2d at 1129-30. In fact, although the trial judge in McPherson made it clear that 
defendant was to be present at sentencing and that serious consequences would occur if 
he was not, the appellate court concluded that a knowing waiver of the right to presence 
did not occur where the record did not show that the defendant was informed that the trial 
would proceed without him. Id. 
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the notion that trial may be commenced in absentia still seems to shock most lawyers, it 
would hardly seem appropriate to impute knowledge that this will occur to their clients." 
Crosby, 506 U.S. at 261 (citation omitted). Moreover, while under the federal rules, a 
trial may continue to conclusion when a defendant disappears after the trial has begun, a 
trial in absentia is not permitted if the defendant fails to appear at the beginning of trial. 
Id. at 262 (citing Taylor v. United States. 414 U.S.17 (1973)). In making a distinction 
between absenting oneself mid-trial and not appearing at the beginning of trial for 
purposes of determining whether a defendant waived his right to presence, the Supreme 
Court recognized that a defendant who flees mid-trial knows that the trial has begun and 
will proceed without him whereas a defendant who does not appear at the beginning of 
trial has no such knowledge. Hence, while a knowing waiver of the right to presence 
occurs when a defendant flees mid-trial, a knowing waiver is not demonstrated when the 
defendant fails to appear at all because the nonappearing defendant did not know that the 
trial would proceed without him. 
Although Anderson supports the McPherson approach, it also fails to control the 
issue before this Court because it involved circumstances which are different from those 
in the present case. The trial court properly tried Anderson in absentia based on a written 
waiver of the right to presence. In determining whether the subsequent sentencing could 
also be conducted in absentia, the Court looked to cases involving similar circumstances 
where a defendant was properly tried in absentia and had not shown up by the time of 
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sentencing. Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1110. Because it would create an anomaly to be able 
to try in absentia a defendant who affirmatively waived his right to presence but then be 
unable to sentence him, the Supreme Court held that sentencing Anderson in absentia 
after he had expressly waived his right to presence at trial was appropriate. Id. The 
Anderson court did not consider the current circumstances, however, where a defendant 
appeared at the plea hearing but was not informed that sentencing would occur without 
her, then later failed to appear at sentencing. 
Moreover, because presence of the defendant at sentencing is even more critical 
than it is at trial, the right to presence at sentencing cannot be lightly forfeited. See 
United States v. Turner. 532 F. Supp. 913, 915 (1982); State v. Fettis. 664 P.2d 208, 209 
(Ariz. 1983). "[T]he common law has traditionally required that the defendant be present 
at his sentencing." Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 915; United States v. Lastra. 973 F.2d 952, 
955 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citation omitted) ("The requirement that the defendant be present 
when sentence is passed has deep common law origins.'"). Presence is of critical 
importance to sentencing not only because it allows the judge to be presented with all of 
the information needed for a full and fair sentencing, but also because it allows the judge 
to question and admonish the defendant. Indeed, "[i]t is only when the defendant is 
before the court that a reasonable and rational sentencing can take place." Fettis, 664 
P.2d at 209. 
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Presence is of instrumental value to the defendant for the exercise of other 
rights, such as to present mitigating evidence and challenge aggravating 
evidence, and it may also be advantageous to him that the decision maker 
be required to face him. The state may have an interest in the presence of 
the defendant in order that the example of personal admonition might deter 
others from similar crimes. Moreover, it may sometimes be important that 
the convicted man be called to account publicly for what he has done, not to 
be made an instrument of the general deterrent, but to acknowledge 
symbolically his personal responsibility for his acts and to receive 
personally the official expression of society's condemnation for his 
conduct. The ceremonial rendering of judgment may also contribute to the 
individual deterrent force of the sentence if the latter is accompanied by 
appropriate judicial comment on the defendant's crime. 
Turner. 532 F. Supp. at 915. 
Presence of the defendant at sentencing also preserves the dignity of the 
individuals being sentenced as well as the court and the system itself. 
Respect for the dignity of the individual is at the base of the right of a man 
to be present when society authoritatively proceeds to decide and announce 
whether it will deprive him of liberty. It shows a fundamental lack of 
respect for the dignity of a man to sentence him in absentia. The presence 
of the defendant indicates that society has sufficient confidence in the 
justness of its judgment to announce it in public to the convicted man 
himself. Presence thus enhances the legitimacy and acceptability of both 
sentence and conviction. 
Turner. 532 F. Supp. at 915-16 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The important 
policy considerations relating to presence at sentencing require that the right to presence 
at sentencing not be easily waived. See id. at 915 (important policy considerations 
supporting right to presence at sentencing "militate against a rule allowing presence at 
sentencing to be lightly waived"). 
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Because of the critical importance of presence to sentencing, many jurisdictions 
refuse to allow sentencing in absentia except in extraordinary circumstances. Fettis, 664 
P.2d at 209. Such extraordinary circumstances, while "rare indeed" (id.), may include 
circumstances where a defendant has expressly waived his right to be present at 
sentencing. See Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 916 (citation omitted). Extraordinary 
circumstances allowing sentencing in absentia may also include circumstances where the 
defendant has been fully informed that sentencing will proceed in his absence if he does 
not appear at the sentencing hearing. See Lowerv v. State, 759 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Ark. 
1988) (court unwilling to find defendant waived the right to presence at sentencing "in the 
absence of language specifically advising an accused that he is subject to being sentenced 
prospectively without his being present"); People v. Link, 685 N.E.2d 624, 626 (111. App. 
1997) (court requires that defendant must be "warned his failure to appear may result in 
the proceedings continuing in absentia" in order to sentence a defendant in absentia); 
People v. Bennett, 557 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (court reasons that 
sentencing in absentia was permissible where defendant was fully advised that sentencing 
would occur in his absence if he failed to appear); People v. Harris, 564 N.Y.S.2d 481 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (same); People v. Christopher R., 522 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1987) (same). These cases support the notion that at the very least, a defendant must be 
informed that the sentencing will occur even if he is not present in order to knowingly 
waive his right to presence. 
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While Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) facilitates due process and the Article I, section 12, 
Utah Constitution right to appear and defend by allowing defendant to speak and present 
information relevant to sentencing, Rule 22(b) allows sentencing to proceed even though 
the defendant is not present ff[o]n the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in 
defendant's absence." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(b). The grounds on which a defendant may 
be tried in his absence are circumstances where the defendant has knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his right to presence; in the context of sentencing, a knowing waiver 
does not occur unless the defendant has been informed that the sentencing will proceed 
even if he is not present. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2), which recognizes that in order to proceed in absentia at 
trial, the defendant must voluntarily waive his right to presence, does not affect the 
determination of whether the constitutional right to presence at sentencing was waived in 
this case. Utah R. Crim P. 17(a)(2) states in part, ff[i]n prosecutions for offenses not 
punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to 
defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or 
judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present." 
While this rule suggests that voluntary absence from trial after notice of the time for trial 
constitutes a waiver of the right to presence at trial, it does not outline what constitutes a 
knowing waiver of the right to presence at sentencing. In other words, while either 
sentencing or trial can proceed without the defendant "on the same grounds," i.e. on the 
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grounds that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to presence, the 
circumstances establishing a knowing waiver may differ, given their distinct roles on a 
criminal case. 
More importantly, even if Rule 17(a)(2) applied to sentencing hearings rather than 
trial, the Article I, section 12 right to presence at sentencing would override the rule. 
Because of the greater importance of presence at sentencing, the fundamental, common 
law roots in requiring presence at sentencing and the lack of awareness by most people 
that a sentencing will be held if the defendant is not present, the right to presence at 
sentencing cannot be waived except in extraordinary circumstances which may include 
circumstances where the defendant was informed that the sentencing would be held even 
if he did not appear. 
In the present case where Rogers was not informed that she would be sentenced 
even if she did not appear at sentencing, Rogers did not knowingly waive her right to 
presence at sentencing.6 The trial judge therefore erred in sentencing Rogers in absentia 
and the sentence must be vacated. 
6
 In Rogers' note to the judge after she was booked into jail following sentencing, 
she stated in part, "I could give you several valid reasons why I missed my sentencing, 
but in retrospect there is not excuse" (R. 71). Her reasons for missing sentencing are not 
listed. While this note arguably addresses whether Rogers' absence was voluntary, in the 
absence of her reasons for missing court, the note does not establish that her absence was 
voluntary. The trial court improperly presumed a voluntary absence based solely on 
Rogers' failure to appear. Moreover, the note in no way suggests that Rogers had 
knowledge that she would be sentenced in absentia if she did not appear (R. 71). 
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2. The Public Interest Did Not Require That Rogers Be Sentenced in 
Absentia. 
In determining whether the right to presence has been waived thereby allowing for 
sentencing in absentia, a trial court must also weigh whether the public interest in 
proceeding without the defendant outweighs the defendant's interest in being present. 
See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111 (court relies on practical considerations which supported 
proceeding with the sentencing in absentia); United States v. Fontanez, 878 F.2d 33, 36 
(2d Cir. 1989) (court considers whether public interest in proceeding with sentencing in 
absentia outweighed defendant's interest in being present in deciding whether to uphold 
sentencing in absentia). 
In Anderson, the Supreme Court upheld the sentencing in absentia after concluding 
that "[practical considerations . . . mitigate[d] in favor of in absentia sentencing.11 
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111. Anderson had executed a written waiver of his right to be 
present, then left the state. The Court was concerned that Anderson could absent himself 
for years "and the eventual sentencing would have to be performed by a judge who was 
unfamiliar with the case and had no access to relevant information." Id. 
Concerns about dilatory defendants who attempt to delay the administration of 
justice by failing to appear at sentencing are remedied by requiring trial judges to exercise 
their discretion to proceed in absentia by balancing "the public interest in proceeding 
[without the defendant]" against the defendant's interest in being present. Smith v. Mann, 
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173 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1999), cert denied, 120 S.Ct. 200; see also Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 
36-37; People v. Parker. 440 N.E.2d 131, 137 (N.Y. 1982). Requiring that trial courts 
balance the public interest in proceeding against the defendant's interest in being present 
ensures that trial courts "vigorously safeguard" the right to presence. Fontanez, 878 F.2d 
at 36. 
The factors to be considered when balancing the public interest in proceeding in 
absentia against the defendant's interest in being present include whether there is a 
possibility that the defendant could be contacted and brought to court within a reasonable 
amount of time, the difficulty in rescheduling the sentencing hearing, the burden on the 
state in not proceeding, and whether there is a possibility that information relevant to 
sentencing will be lost. See Parker, 440 N.E.2d at 1317; Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 36; 
Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1111. 
In this case, Judge Frederick erred in sentencing Rogers in absentia where the 
judge did not balance the public interest in proceeding against Rogers' interest in being 
present, and the record fails to demonstrate that the public interest required that Rogers be 
sentenced in absentia. Rogers could have been easily contacted since she had lived in the 
same place for eighteen years (R. 12). In fact, she was picked up and booked less than a 
month after sentencing (R. 53). Continuing the sentencing hearing to another date would 
not have been difficult; sentencing hearings take a relatively short amount of time and are 
often rescheduled. The state would not have been burdened by a continuance since it 
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presented no information pertinent to sentencing; the state could have easily done the 
same thing if the sentencing had been rescheduled, and there was no threat that 
information relevant to sentencing would be lost if sentencing were rescheduled. Since 
Judge Frederick had taken the case from another judge, was not present when the plea 
was taken and had no specific knowledge that would be lost, the public had no interest in 
maintaining him as the judge; even if a delay in sentencing caused reassignment of the 
case, information pertinent to sentencing would not be lost and the effective 
administration of justice would not be undermined since Judge Frederick did not sit 
through the trial as the Anderson judge had, and did not take the plea. 
Moreover, the public interest would have been better served by continuing the 
sentencing hearing so that Rogers could be present. Requiring Rogers to "account 
publicly" for her crime and take responsibility before the judge for her actions would 
better serve society's interest in seeking no future criminal behavior from Rogers. See 
Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 915. In addition, "[t]he ceremonial rendering of judgment may 
also contribute to the individual deterrent force of the sentence" (id), thereby furthering 
society's interest in having the sentence deter future criminal conduct. The integrity of 
the system and respect for the individual would also have been served by continuing 
sentencing rather than sentencing Rogers in absentia. In this case, Rogers' presence at 
sentencing would have actually furthered society's interests while also protecting her 
right to presence. 
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Rogers' fundamental, critical interest in being present for sentencing was not 
outweighed by the public interest in proceeding. The trial judge therefore erred in 
sentencing Rogers absentia and the sentence must be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Tara A. Rogers respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
her sentence and remand her case for a new sentencing hearing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this U^fu day of January, 2001. 
\JQAL C. ultty 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
NISA J. SISNEROS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
28 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered eight copies 
of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th Floor, P. O. Box 
140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's 
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this A^-u. day of January, 2001. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's 
Office as indicated above this day of January, 2001. 
29 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TARA AADELE ROGERS, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail 
PRESENT 
Clerk: cindyb 
Prosecutor: BOWN, GREGORY L. 
Defendant not present 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SISNEROS, NISA J 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: July 31, 1977 
Video 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 9:47-9:48 
CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) -
Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 06/20/2000 Guilty Plea 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED ILLEGAL POSS/USE 
OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 1 year(s) 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 001906958 FS 
Judge: J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Date: Auaust 4, 2000 
Page 1 00041 
Case No: 001906958 
Date: Aug 04, 2000 
The Court finds the defendant has voluntarily absented herself from 
the sentencing proceedings and the Court orders the defendant be 
committed forthwith upon her arrest. Counsel for the State to 
prepare the findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
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Case NO. 001906958FS 
SENTENCING 
(Videotape Proceedings) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
-oOo-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TARA AADELE ROGERS, 
Defendant. 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 4th day of August, 
2000, commencing at the hour of 9:47 a.m., the above-
entitled matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE 
J. DENNIS FREDERICK, sitting as Judge in the above-named 
Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the 
following videotape proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
FILED D5TRSCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
<1>D i Q W M 
GREGORY L. BOWN 
Deputy Salt Lake County 
District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
NISA J. SISNEROS 
Attorney at Law 
Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake city, Utah 84111 
FILED 
i A i . . s^-- • - ' • — ' • • : 
ORIGINAL 
OCT 2 0 2000 ALAN P. ^MITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107 
COURT OF APPEALS 
• * / # i|5KA 
nnnftn 
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3 MS. SISNEROS: And my l a s t mat ter i s Tara R o g e r s , 
4 No. 17 . 
5 THE COURT: Very well. Ms. Sisneros, this is 
6 apparently another one of these absentia cases; right? 
7 MS. SISNEROS: Correct. 
8 THE COURT: This is State of Utah vs. Tara Aadele 
9 Rogers, Case No. CR006958. Ms. Sisneros appearing for the 
10 defendant, Mr. Bown for the State. Tara Aadele Rogers is 
11 not present. 
12 The—this Court will determine that she has 
13 likewise voluntarily absented herself from these 
14 proceedings. She was advised both orally and in writing to 
15 appear before this Court, as—on today's date, as well as 
16 appear at A.C.E.C., for reasons best known to whatever the-
17 -whoever the clerk was who referred her. She did not 
18 appear there, a warrant was previously issued for her 
19 arrest. No further contact has been made with her, 
20 therefore, I will determine that she's voluntarily absented 
21 herself from these proceedings. 
22 And I will order, based upon her failure to 
23 comply with the terms and conditions of this Court's 
24 previous order, that she be committed to the Salt Lake 
25 County Adult Detention Center forthwith for the period of 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
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one year , for 
possession of 
the Class A misdemeanor 
a controlled substance, 
guilty to on the 20th of June of this 
upon her 
And the order of commitment 
crime of attempted 
to which she pled 
year. 
will be forthwith 
arrest on the no bail warrant previously issued. 
Thank you, Ms. Sisneros. 
MS. SISNEROS: And just for 
note my objection— 
I have. 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
MS. 
COURT: Yes. 
the record, I would 
SISNEROS: —for sentencing in absentia. 
COURT: And thank you. 
SISNEROS: Thank you, your Honor. That's all 
May I please be excused? 
THE COURT: Yes. You may. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-v-
TARA A. ROGERS, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO CORRECT 
ILLEGAL SENTENCE 
CaseNo.001906958FS 
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Defendant, Tara A. Rogers, by and through counsel, Nisa J. Sisneros, hereby moves the court 
to correct it's illegal sentence imposed on August 4,2000 pursuant to Rule 22(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, State v. Waestaff. 772 P.2d 987 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and State v. 
Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1996). Ms. Rogers was not present at the sentencing. The court 
found that she had voluntarily absented herself from the proceedings and sentenced her to the 
maximum jail sentence allowed by law. However, Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure states a defendant is entitled to "make a statement and to present any mitigation of 
punishment, or show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed". Any imposition of 
sentence without Ms. Rogers' presence violated her rights to due process and to allocution as 
found in the Constitution of Utah art. I, §§ 7 & 12, and the 5th, 8th and 14th Amendments of the 
00046 
United States Constitution. At the time of sentencing the court was unaware as to why Ms. 
Rogers was not present. The court made the assumption that any absence was voluntary. 
Rule 22 (b) allows the court to issue a bench warrant if a defendant fails to appear for 
sentencing. Therefore, Ms. Rogers requests that the court correct it's sentence and issue a bench 
warrant for her arrest allowing her to address the court prior to being sentenced. 
Ms. Rogers requests the court set this matter for hearing. 
DATED this 10th day 6f August, 2000. 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, 
231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this day of August, 2000. 
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ADDENDUM D 
NUIIBJSTBICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
DAVID E. YOCOM &'& - 9 21 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
GREGORY L. BOWN, 0402 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
TARA A. ROGERS, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND ORDER 
Case No. 001906958 
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
The above-entitled case came before this Court for sentencing on August 4, 2000. The 
State of Utah was represented by its counsel, Gregory L. Bown, Deputy District Attorney, and 
the defendant, who was not present was represented by Nina Sisneros. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
On June 15, 2000, defendant entered a guilty plea in the above-entitled matter to 
Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class A misdemeanor, before Judge William 
W. Barrett. Defendant, who was present with counsel, was referred to ACEC for a presentence 
report and was given the sentencing date of August 4, 2000, at 8:30 AM before the Honorable J. 
Dennis Frederick. On August 4, 2000, the defendant failed to appear before this court for 
sentencing. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Rule 22 states, "On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's 
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence." Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 22(b). 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
Case No. 001909844 
Page 2 
Because defendant and her counsel were both given personal and actual notice of the 
August 4, 2000, sentencing date, and the defendant voluntarily failed to appear for her 
sentencing, defendant should be sentenced in her absence. Furthermore, the defendant has 
waived any right to be present by her voluntary absence after being given personal notice in open 
court. 
ORDER 
Based upon defendant's voluntary absence, defendant shall be sentenced in abstentia for 
the offense of Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class A misdemeanor. 
DATED this W^day of August, 2000. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
Case No. 001909844 
Page 3 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact, 
Conclusions Of Law And Order was delivered to Nina Sisneros, Attorney for Defendant Jon 
Donald Hamling, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the day 
of August, 2000. 
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ADDENDUM E 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 17. The trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial 
with the following exceptions: 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may con-
sent in writing to trial in his absence; 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's 
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial 
shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered 
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present; 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of 
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. 
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's 
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a 
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be 
issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal 
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with 
the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose 
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court 
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department 
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-2Q2(l)(b), the court 
shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996.) 
CONSHTUTTON OF UTAH 
Sec- 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
-oOo-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TARA AADELE ROGERS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 001906958FS 
PLEA HEARING 
(Videotape Proceedings') 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 20th day of June, 
2000, commencing at the hour of 10:49 a.m., the above-
entitled matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT, sitting as Judge in the above-named 
Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the 
following videotape proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
ras>Dts7aicr COURT 
\z? 19 
j£ .<•£* pg — 
KELLY R. SHEFFIELD 
Deputy Salt Lake County 
District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
NISA J. SISNEROS 
Attorney at Law 
Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
FILED 
°CT 2 a ;ooo 
ORIGINAL 
ALAN P. ^MITH, CSj 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 21 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107 %b@URT 
7lU.il 
OF APR 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 MS. SISNEROS: Tara Rogers. 
4 THE COURT: This is Case No. 001906958. 
5 MS. SISNEROS: And we have a resolution on that, 
6 your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. What are we doing? 
8 MS. SISNEROS: Ms. Rogers will be pleading to an 
9 attempted possession of a controlled substance, Class A. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. Have you gone over her 
11 Constitutional rights with her? 
12 MS. SISNEROS: Yes. I have, your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: And do you believe the plea will be 
14 freely, voluntarily and knowingly given? 
15 MS. SISNEROS: Yes. 
16 THE COURT: Ms. Rogers, do you understand the 
17 English language? 
18 MS. ROGERS: Yes. I do. 
19 THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the advice 
20 given you by Ms. Sisneros? 
21 MS. ROGERS: Yes. I am. 
22 THE COURT: You've heard the statements made by 
23 her. Do you intend to plead guilty to this Class A 
24 misdemeanor, attempted possession of a controlled 
25 substance? 
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drugs or 
MS. 
THE 
MS. 
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ROGERS: 
COURT: 
ROGERS: 
COURT: 
alcohol, are 
MS. 
THE 
medication? 
MS. 
THE 
Are 
MS. 
THE 
MS. 
ROGERS: 
COURT: 
ROGERS: 
COURT: 
Yes. I do. 
How long have you been in jail now? 
I am going—two weeks, going on 
You're not under the influence of any 
you? 
No, I'm not. 
Are you taking any kind of 
No, I'm not. 
No? 
you a high school graduate? 
ROGERS: 
COURT: 
ROGERS: 
Yes, I am. 
Where did you go to school? 
I went to Cotton—I went to 
Cottonwood High School and I have brief time at the College 
of Eastern Utah. 
presently 
have the 
THE COURT: And you do understand the charges 
r
 pending against you; right? 
MS. 
THE 
ROGERS: 
COURT: 
Yes. I do. 
And you do also understand that you 
right to plead not guilty, if you choose? 
MS. 
THE 
ROGERS: 
COURT: 
Yes. I do. 
Okay. Ms. Sisneros has gone over 
your Constitutional rights. I'm going to go over those 
3 
1 again. You need to understand that you're giving these 
2 rights up by entering a guilty plea. 
3 The right to a speedy trial, the right to an 
4 impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine 
5 witnesses produced by the State and provide a defense. The 
6 right against self-incrimination, the right to compel 
7 witnesses on your own behalf at no cost to you. The right 
8 to proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and if 
9 convicted, the right to appeal the conviction. You also 
10 have the presumption of innocence until such time as you 
11 enter your guilty plea. 
12 Do you understand these rights? 
13 MS. ROGERS: Yes. I do. 
14 THE COURT: And do you understand that you're 
15 giving these rights up by entering a guilty plea to this 
16 amended charge? 
17 MS. ROGERS: Yes. I do. 
18 THE COURT: Now, you're pleading to a Class A 
19 misdemeanor. That means you can be sentenced up to a year 
20 in jail. You can also be fined a maximum of $2,500 plus an 
21 85 percent surcharge. Do you understand that? 
22 MS. ROGERS: Yes. I do. 
23 THE COURT: Did anybody make any promises to you 
24 that made you decide to enter a guilty plea to this amended 
25 charge? 
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MS. ROGERS: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Did anybody threaten you in any way? 
MS. ROGERS: No, sir. 
THE COURT: How do you plead to the charge of 
attempted possession of a controlled substance, a Class A 
misdemeanor? Guilty or not guilty? 
MS. ROGERS: Guilty. 
THE COURT: I'll accept your guilty plea at this 
time. 
Would you have her sign the statement, please? 
Thank you. 
Based upon the statements made to me by Ms. 
Sisneros and the answers to my queries from Ms. Rogers, I'm 
going to find that she freely, voluntarily and knowingly 
executed this statement and approve it at this time and 
incorporating this statement by reference, accept her 
guilty plea, enter a conviction. 
Will she waive the maximum time for sentencing so 
we can get a pre-sentence report? 
MS. SISNEROS: Yes, your Honor. 
THE CLERK: August 4th at 8:30, Judge Frederick. 
THE COURT: How about her custody status? 
MS. SISNEROS: Your Honor, I talked to Pre-Trial 
and they've indicated, with the plea, that they would be 
willing to—to release her. 
1 THE COURT: Is that right? 
2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That is correct, your 
3 Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to release you to 
5 Pre-Trial. You do what they tell you to do, you make sure 
6 that you go to Adult Parole & Probation and get that pre-
7 sentence report prepared and then appear before Judge 
8 Frederick on the date that was given. Okay? 
9 MS. SISNEROS: And your Honor, if I may address 
10 that? I have talked to Ms. Rogers about the possibility of 
11 doing the pre-sentence report. She did want me to request 
12~ the possibility of A.C.E.C. instead of A P & P. 
13 THE COURT: Doesn't matter. I can send her to 
14 A.C.E.C. if she wants. 
15 MS. SISNEROS: And I prepared an order of 
16 release. May I approach? 
17 THE COURT: Uh huh. 
18 MS. ROGERS: So, I will be released this evening, 
19 your Honor, is that correct? 
20 THE COURT: Yeah, you will. 
21 MS. SISNEROS: Thanks, your Honor. 
22 (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
23 
24 * * * 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE I 
STATE OF UTAH ) I 
: ss. II 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 11 
I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter, II 
Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape II 
Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of 
Utah, do certify that I received an electronically recorded 
videotape of the within matter and caused the same to be 
transcribed into typewriting, and that the foregoing pages, j 
numbered from 1 to 6, inclusive, to the best of my 
knowledge, constitute a full, true and correct 
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape 
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this JlJLth day of 
September,2000. 
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TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss. 
I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify: 
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith, 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court 
Transcriber of Tape Recorded Court Proceedings; that I 
received an electronically recorded videotape of the within 
matter and under his supervision have transcribed the same 
into typewriting, and the foregoing pages, numbered from 1 
to 6, inclusive, to the best of my ability constitute a 
full, true and correct transcription, except where it is 
indicated the Videotape Recorded Court Proceedings were 
inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 12th day of 
September, 2000. 
Transcriber 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day 
of September, 2000. 
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